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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by respondents 
for personal injuries and wrongful death 
resulting from an automobile accident that 
occurred on February 12, 1964, at Roosevelt, 
l!tah. 
-2-
Appellant petitioneci, and was granted, 
<=:n Intermediate Appeal from an Order of the 
District Court of Duchesne County, requiring 
:::ppec:.Jlant to answer an i::J.terrogatory submitted 
~he respondents. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOVVER COURT 
The District Court of Duchesne 
CocJnty, Joseph E. Nelson, Judge, entered an 
<:);·der requiring the appellant to answer an 
.:n tc.::--:oga tory :en quiring as tc the existence of 
l1~0.'.J..'.ty insurance, and the name of tl"le appellant's 
lic.::i.:.l.ity i.nsurance carrier. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
':i:'he respondents seek to have :he 
C:~l2: of t:-i.e District Court affirmed a:id to re-
r.::~1;-e a_;)pellant to answer the i.nterrogatory as to 
U:e existence of liability insurance. 
-3-
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents agree with the State-
ment of facts set forth in appellant's brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY 
REQUIRED THE APPELLANT TO ANSWER THE 
INTERROGATORY RELATING TO THE NAME OF 
APPELLANT'S INSURANCE CARRIER AND THE 
LIMITS OF LIABILITY. 
The general rule as per the numerical 
weight of authorities permitting interrogatories 
into the extent of insurance coverage is found in 
17 Am. Jur., Sec. 30, page 35, Discovery and 
Inspection, as follows: 
11*** Under modern pre-trial 
discovery proceedings providing 
for examination of a party 
regarding matters relevant to the 
subject matter involved in the 
pending action, the plaintiff may 
-4-
ascertain from a defendant whether 
he carries liability insurance and 
if so, the amount of such insurance 
and the identity of the insurer." 
The principal issue in determining this 
question seems to be whether such discovery is 
"relevant to the subject matter" of the action. 
11*** The deponent may be examined 
regarding any matter, not privileged, 
which is relevant to the subject matter 
involved in the pending action, 
whether it relates to the claim or 
defense of the examining party, or 
to the claim or defense of any other 
party.*** It is not grounds for 
objection that the testimony will 
be inadmissible at the trial if the 
testimony sought appears reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery 
of admissible evidence. 11 
Rule 2 6 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; Rule 26 (b) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
As noted, the term 11 relevant" is not 
limited to matter which is admissible in evidence 
at the trial, but includes all of those things which 
-5-
are relevant to the subject matter of the action. 
It is relevancy to the subject matter that is 
controlling. The majority of the few reported 
cases that have dealt with the question have 
held that discovery of the existence and dollar 
limits:, of liability policies in automobile torts 
cases is 11 relevant 11 and available. 
The landmark case permitting 
inquiry concerning liability insurance by way of 
discovery and inspection is the case of Maddox 
v Grauman, ( Ky. 1954) 265 S. W. 2d 939, 41 
A. L. R. 2d 9 64. In that case the plaintiff sought 
in a pre-trial deposition to ascertain the amount 
and the name of the insurance carrier of the def-
endant. The defendant objected and the witness 
was instructed not to answer the question. The 
matter was submitted to the trial court and the 
-6-
defendant was ordered to answer, and upon 
refusal was found guilty of contempt of court. 
The issue was appealed to the Kentucky Court 
of Appeals. The Kentucky Rules of Civil 
Procedure were substantially identical with 
Rule 26 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The Court held that while the question of automo-
bile liability insurance is improper in the trial 
and should not be presented to the jury, it is, 
nevertheless, a proper matter for pre-trial 
discovery. In discussing the point of 
relevancy, the Court stated: 
" If the insurance question is relevant 
to the subject matter after the 
plaintiff prevails, why is it not 
relevant while the action pends? 
We believe it is. An insurance 
contract is no longer a secret, 
private, confidential arrangement 
between the insurance carrier and 
the individual but it is an agreement 
that embraces those whose person 
-7-
or property may be injured by the 
negligent act of the insured. We 
conclude the answers to the 
propounded questions are relevant 
to the subject matter of the 
litigation and within the spirit 
and meaning of C. R. 26 .02. 11 
In the case of Brackett v Woodall 
rood Products. (Tenn. 1951 D. C.) 12F. R. D. 
4, Judge Darr held: 
"The Court is of the opinion, however, 
that the plaintiffs should have an 
opportunity to examine the liability 
insurance policy of their alleged 
tort feasor on the broad viewpoint 
that it is relevant to the subject 
matter of the litigation, and within 
purview of Rules 34 and 26 (b) of 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 11 
See also Orqel v Mccurdy, ( D. C. 
1948 N. Y .) 8 F. R. D. 585; Superior 
Insurance Company v Superior Court 
in and for Los Angeles County ( Cal. 
1951) 2 35 P2d 833 
Some courts have concluded that 
insurance coverage is relevant to the subject 
matter of a tort action on very general grounds. 
-8-
( See Williams, Discovery of Dollar Limits in 
Liability Policies in Automobile Tort Cases, 
10 Ala. L. Rev. 355, 1958) A more specific 
rational relied on by other courts is that the 
injured party has a discoverable interest in the 
policy because he is the beneficiary thereof. In 
essence, this is the position adopted by the court 
in Lucas v District Court, (Colo. 1959) 345 P2d 
1064. That decision arose from a mandamus pro-
ceeding to require the district court to enter an 
order compelling the defendants to answer in-
quiries into the existence and extent of liability 
insurance. The court concerned itself with the 
scope of discovery under Rule 26 (b), R. C. P. 
Colo. , which rule is identical to the Utah Rule. 
Justice Doyle, after referring to·-a multitude of 
noteworth cases in point, held: 
-9-
11 As a result of our study of the 
rules, the statute and the 
decisions of other jurisdictions, 
it is our opinion that the holding 
which allows questions to be 
propounded in pre-trial depo-
sitions for the purpose of eliciting 
information as to the existence 
of liability insurance and the 
policy limits of such liability 
insurance is the better rule, and 
the one which is more in accord 
with the object, purpose and 
philosophy of the rules of civil 
procedure. This object and 
purpose is served by holding 
that the scope of examination 
is broad. This will have a 
tendency to eliminate secrets , 
mysteries and surprises and 
should promote disposition 
of cases without trial and 
substantially just results in 
those cases which are tried." 
3j;l5 p 2d 1070 
Also, in the case of Hurley v 
Schmidt, (Oreg. 1965 D. C.) 37F. R. D. 1, 
the Court held that the defendant was required to 
respond to inquiries regarding insurance or other 
-10-
indemnity coverage when required by plaintiff. In 
so ruling, the Court stated: 
"*** that the subject matter of these 
interrogatories is relevant to the 
subject matter involved in this pending 
action and that they are within the 
spirit and meaning of Rule 26 (b)." 
In 1964, the Supreme Court of Alaska 
required a defendant to produce a public liability 
and property damage insurance policy in the case 
of Miller v Harpster, (Alaska 1964) 392 P2d 21. 
In that case defendant objected to producing the 
insurance policy or revealing its limits, contend-
ing that such information was not relative to the 
issues of the case nor could such information 
reasonably lead to the discovery of relevant facts. 
The Court held: 
" We believe that the policy does 
have a relevancy to the issues and 
that no error was committed in order-
ing it to be produced. Definite know-
-11-
ledge as to whether or not there 
was insurance coverage and if 
there was the name of the carrier 
and the amount would be of 
assistance to the plaintiff in 
determining whether to prosecute 
or settle the action. Requiring 
production and disclosure does 
not , in our opinion , confer any 
advantage on respondent in so 
far as the actual trial of the 
issues is concerned." 
( See also People ex. rel. Terry 
v Fisher, (Ill. 1957) 145 N. E. 
2d 588; Pettie v Superior Court 
of Los Angeles County, ( Cal. 
1960) 3 Cal. Rptr. 267; Christie 
v Board of Regents of Univ. of 
Michigan, ( Mich. 1961) 111 N. W. 
2d 30; Hill v Greer ,(N. J. 1961 
D. C .) 30. F. R. D. 64 ) 
Of the 44 cases cited by appellant 
concerning inquiries into insurance coverage, 20 
of these cases permitted the inquiry. There are 7 
other cases, not cited by appellant, which have 
required the opposing party to divulge insurance 
coverage. 
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Demaree v Superior Court (Cal. 1937) 
73 P2d 605; 
Villars v Portsmouth ( N. H. 195 7) 
129 A. 2d 914; 
Pettie v Superior Court of Los Angeles 
County, supra; 
Rolf Homes Inc. v Superior Court of · 
San Mateo, ( Cal. 1960) 9 Cal. 
Rptr. 142; 
Patterson v Highway Insurance 
Underwriters, ( Tex. 1955) 2 78 S. W. 
2d 207; 
Hurley v Schmidt, _supra; 
Hurt v Cooper ( Ky. 1959 W. D .) 175 
F. Supp. 712 • 
Many of the decisions relied upon by 
appellant should be viewed with skepticism and 
ate inappropriate as authority in that those 
decisions were from states operating under rules 
dis similar to the :federal Rules and the UtahR ules. 
In Goheen v Goheen ( N. J. 1931) 154 
A. 39 3, probably the earliest decision on point, 
the Court denied the use of interrogatories to 
discover limits of automobile liability insurance 
-13-
because discovery at that time was limited to 
matters that would constitute relevant and 
competent evidence at the trial. This was prior 
to the 1946 amendment to the Pederal Riles which 
added the last sentence of the present Rule 26 (b) 
to make clear the liberal interpretation intended. 
Similarly,BeanvBest, (S.D.1957) 80N.W. 
2nd 565, in an action against a sheriff for false 
arrest, is equally inappropriate as South Dakota 
had adopted the Federal Rules prior to the 1946 
amendment and it was not subsequently added to 
their rules. Verrastro v Grecco, ( Conn. 1958) 149 
A. 2d 70 3, arising from an auto collision, and 
State ex rel. Allen v Second Judicial District Court, 
(Nev. 1952) 245 P2d 999, an action testing the 
perpetuation of testimony statute in Nevada, also 
without import as they were decided under proced-
-14-
ural rules much more narrow than the Federal Rules. 
The question of discovery as to the ex-
tent of liability insurance first came to the Courts 
operating under the rules parallel to the Federal 
Rules as they now exist in the case of Qrgel v 
McCurdy, supra. Here, as in Layton v Cregan 
and Mallory Company, ( Mich. 1933) 248 N. W. 
539, discovery was sought on the basis of a 
contested issue as to the operation and control 
of the motor vehicle. However, the court went 
further than required and decided the question 
on the ground that it was relevant within the broad 
meaning of relevancy as used in Rule 26(b). Here 
was formed the nucleus that has split both the 
Federal and State courts applying the discovery 
rules and interpretation of the scope of relevancy • 
-15-
in light of the purposes of discovery. 
Appellant's brief attempts to 
distinguish those decisions permitting the 
discovery of insurance on the basis that the 
insurance or safety responsibility statutes in 
those states are unique. Those statutes normally 
give a direct right of action against an insurer if 
a judgment is not satisfied. But in Johanek v 
Aberle, (Mont. 1961 D. C.) 27 F. R. D. 272, 
a federal court concluded that the policy require-
ments of safety responsibility statutes exact 
nothing more than the normal provisions of the 
standard automobile liability policy. In discarding 
this distinction, the Court held: 
"*** It should be noted, however, 
that the standard automobile 
liability ilsurance policy used by 
most insurance companies has for 
many years included provisions 
essentially the same as those 
-16-
required for policies issued in 
California and Illinois.*** 
I 
" While there may here be no 
discoverable interest by virtue 
of any statutory requirement, 
a discoverable interest may 
nevertheless inure to an injured 
party by virtue of the same 
provisions in the standard policy 
itself. Whether based upon 
the statutory requirement or the 
provisions of the standard policy, 
the injured party may not institute 
any action against the insurer 
until after judgment. After 
judgment he has the same right 
of action under the standard 
policy as he would have under 
the statute. The same reasoning 
applies in permitting him to 
ascertain the policy provisions 
in the personal injury action. 
2 7 F. R. D. 2 76 *** 
"*** I agree with the conclusion 
of the Colorado Court that the 
holding permitting discovery 
of policy information is the 
better rule. 'And the one which 
is more in accord with the object, 
purpose and philosophy of the 
Rules of Civil Procedure ' 11 • 
See Furumizo v United States ( D. Hawaii 
1963) 33 F. R. D. 18; Schwentner v White 
( D. Mont. 1961) 199 F. Supp. 710. 
-17-
It may be conceded that one of the 
main purposes and results of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, emulated by Utah and other 
states, is to induce pre-trial settlements. 
(See 24 Wash. L. Rev. 21, 1949) The 
instant case should be justified on that basis 
alone. Rule 1 of the Federal Rules and Utah 
Rules requires a liberal construction in their 
application: 
11 They shall be liberally construed 
to secure the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of 
every action • " 
It can scarcely be disputed that a fair and 
equitable settlement of an action is often a more 
just and certainly more speedy determination of 
it, than ordinarily follows an actual trial of the 
issues therein. If, as is often the case, disclos-
ure of the insurance coverage will bring about 
-18-
such settlements, it would seem that the ends 
sought by the rules as above disclosed, the just, 
speedy and inexpensive determination of every 
action, are thereby effectively attained. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondents r.espectfully submit.: that 
the disclosure of the insurance coverage by 
appellant is relevant to the subject matter of 
the action and that the Order of the District 
Court of Duchesne County should be affirmed. 
Respectfully Submitted 
WILFORD A. BEESLEY 
15 Ea st 4th South 
Salt.La!<e City, Utah 
Attorney for Respondents 
